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Justice Sanford and Modern Free
Speech Analysis:
Back to the Future?
By PHILIP J. PRYGOSKI*
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent article on today's United States Supreme Court
argues that strong similarities exist between the jurisprudence of
the Court of the 1930's and that of the 1980's.' The Article
contends that "[tihe [Burger] Court's rulings in the civil liberties
areas ... provide a high degree of correlation between the
constitutional doctrines used fifty years ago and current political
positions."
'2
This Article explores the extent to which these correlations
exist, and the reasons they are likely to be increasingly evident
in first amendment jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. Al-
though case law contains no articulated resurrection of old first
amendment doctrines, themes and methods of analysis popular
in the 1920's and 1930's are discernible in recent cases involving
free speech claims.'
A problem that has persisted in the first amendment freedom
of speech4 area since the 1920's is how to strike a constitutionally
acceptable balance between the speech interests of the speaker
and the legitimate police power concerns of the regulating body.
* Professor of Law, Thomas M. Cooley Law School; J.D., LL.M., University
of Michigan Law School.
I Nowak, Resurrecting Realist Jurisprudence: The Political Bias of Burger Court
Justices, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 549 (1983).
Id. at 589.
See, e.g., id. at 589-94.
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Although specific tests have been developed in particular areas
such as obscenity,5 libel and slander,6 and "fighting words, ' 7 a
question remains as to what method of analysis is appropriate
in the more general context of speech regulation.
Following an analysis of two important cases from the 1920's,
Gitlow v. New York," and Whitney v. California,9 this Article
examines two of the major analytical tools used by the modern
Supreme Court: the clear and present danger test 0 and the
balancing test as set forth in United States v. O'Brien." One
must ask which of these two modern methods of first amend-
ment review is analytically indicated by the factual situation
before a court (or legislature at the other end of the legal
process).' 2 The main contention of this Article is that the choice
The first amendment does not protect obscene material. Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957). To determine whether a particular work is obscene, and therefore
unprotected, the trier of fact must consider the following three factors:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community stand-
ards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest . . . ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-5 (1973).
6 In Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), the Court held that a state,
attempting to maintain peace and order, could impose criminal sanctions for libel directed
at a racial group. The standard, however, for awarding damages for libel directed at a
public official acting in his official capacity is more stringent. Before damages can be
awarded, the official must prove "actual malice." He must prove that the remark was
made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
1 Fighting words are those that by their nature cause injury or are likely to lead
to an instantaneous disruption of the peace. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942). Fighting words are not protected by the first amendment, and the test
employed by the court in determining their existence is whether the language would
prompt an average individual to fight. Id. at 573.
6 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See notes 13-35 infra and accompanying text.
274 U.S. 357 (1927), rev'd, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
,o For a discussion of the "clear and present danger" test, see notes 196-239 infra
and accompanying text.
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Professor Linde decried what he perceived as too strong and automatic a focus
on the judicial as opposed to the legislative function in constitutional adjudication:
If empiricism is a source of strength in judicial review, however, it is
also a source of weakness in constitutional law. The weakness results from
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of the correct method of analysis is, to a large extent, a function
of federalism and separation of powers concepts. Specifically,
one must scrutinize the deference a court will show to a federal,
state, or municipal legislative body when it attempts to regulate
activity that includes or is a result of speech. The closer a
legislature is able to connect regulable conduct with speech, the
more likely a reviewing court will defer to the legislative judg-
ment concerning the regulation of the speech which is a part of,
or attendant to, the conduct.
A. Gitlow and Whitney
When considering the evolution and direction of modern free
speech analysis, it is important to consider major historical
antecedents that might shed some light on the limits of contem-
porary doctrine. Gitlow v. New York' 3 and Whitney v.
California'4 are two of the seminal cases for modern first amend-
ment theory. 5 Gitlow and Whitney both involved state laws
forbidding advocacy of force or violence as a means of over-
throwing the existing government. Justice Sanford wrote the
majority opinion in each case,' 6 with a strong dissent by Justice
seeing constitutional law almost entirely in the framework of adjudication;
both judges and commentators habitually analyze constitutional questions
in terms of how courts should decide cases. This professional preoccupation
with the judicial function not only neglects the legislative function, but
worse, it reverses the relationship between the two. The constitutional limits
on legislation are, in effect, deduced from the premises of judicial review,
not judicial review from the constitutional limits on legislation.
Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Con-
certo, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1175 (1969-70).
268 U.S. 652.
, 274 U.S. 357.
The law of free speech we know today grows out of the Supreme Court
decisions following World War I-Schenck v. United States, Abrams v. United
States, Gitlow v. New York, Whitney v. California-not out of the ma-
jority positions but rather from the opinions, mostly dissents or concur-
rences that were really dissents, of Justices Holmes and Brandeis.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 23
(1971-72).
' Professor, now Judge, Bork argued that "the law should have been built on
Justice Sanford's majority opinions in Gitlow and Whitney." Id.
1986-871
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Holmes in Gitlow,17 and a concurrence, in form but not in
substance, by Justice Brandeis in Whitney.18
Justice Sanford's analysis in Gitlow and Whitney is impor-
tant insofar as it reflects an extremely deferential role for the
Court in reviewing state legislative acts that restrict the exercise
of speech activities. 9 It is precisely the kind of limited review
role that is reflected in important first amendment decisions by
the Burger Court.
Gitlow was convicted under a New York statute forbidding
criminal anarchy-'"the doctrine that organized government
should be overthrown by force or violence" or any other unlaw-
ful means.20 As a member of the Left Wing section of the
Socialist party, he participated in the adoption and publication
of a "Manifesto" which, among other things, called for "rev-
olutionary mass action" for the "purpose of conquering and
destroying the parliamentary state." ' 2' Even though Justice San-
ford's opinion found that "[t]here was no evidence of any effect
resulting from the publication and circulation of the Mani-
festo, ' 12 2 the Court affirmed Gitlow's conviction.23
Whitney was convicted under the California Criminal Synd-
icalism Act which prohibited the advocacy or teaching "of crime,
sabotage ... or unlawful acts of force or violence ... as a
means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or
control, or effecting any political change." ' 24 The Criminal Synd-
icalism Act also punished any person who "[o]rganizes ... or
knowingly becomes a member of, any ... group ... of persons
organized or assembled to advocate, [or] teach ... criminal
syndicalism. ' '2 5 Whitney was convicted of assisting in the orga-
nization of, and being a member of, the Communist Labor Party
" 268 U.S. at 672 (Brandeis, J., joining the dissent).
274 U.S. at 372 (Holmes, J., joining the concurrence).
' See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
- 268 U.S. at 654.
2 Id. at 658.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 672.




of California. 26 Her conviction was upheld by the Supreme
Court.
27
Because the state laws in Gitlow and Whitney specifically
defined the prohibited speech,
[The Court could choose among three positions. It could (1)
accept this legislative judgment of the harmful potential of the
proscribed words, subject to conventional judicial review; (2)
independently scrutinize the facts to see whether a "danger,"
[as defined by the legislature] ... justified suppression of the
particular expression; or (3) hold that by legislating directly
against the words rather than the effects, the lawmaker had
gone beyond the leeway left to trial and proof by ... the first
amendment. 8
According to Professor, now Judge, Bork, Justice Sanford's
majority opinions in both cases chose the first method of review,
holding "essentially that the Court's function in speech cases
was the limited but crucial one of determining whether the
legislature had defined a category of forbidden speech which
might constitutionally be suppressed." 29 Once the Court deter-
mined that "the category was defined in a permissible way and
the defendant's speech or publication fell within the definition,"
the Court's review role was at an end.30
In Gitlow, after asserting the "principle that the State is
primarily the judge of regulations required in the interest of
public safety and welfare," 3' Justice Sanford espoused an ex-
tremely deferential role for a court when it reviews a statute
passed pursuant to a state's police power.
In other words, when the legislative body has determined gen-
erally, in the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that ut-
terances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive
" Id. at 372.
:" Id.
Linde, supra note 12, at 1171.
:' Bork, supra note 15, at 32.
Id.
268 U.S. at 668.
1986-87]
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evil that they may be punished, the question whether any
specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely,
in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open
to consideration. It is sufficient that the statute itself be con-
stitutional and that the use of the language comes within its
prohibition .3
2
Both Gitlow and Whitney33 reflect an analysis in which the
primary question for a court reviewing a statute specifically
proscribing certain speech is whether the legislature has properly
determined that the speech activity "involves" such danger of
substantive evil that the speech activity may be regulated attend-
ant to the prohibition or punishment of the substantive evil. 4
Once the court determines that the legislature properly asserted
the requigite "involvement" of substantive evil with speech ac-
tivity, the court's review role is at an end.
35
Obviously, an acceptable legislative declaration that a certain
kind of speech activity causes or is accompanied by a prohibit-
able substantive evil is the sine qua non of a Gitlow-Whitney
method of analysis. 36 An important question in modern free
speech theory concerns the method by which a legislature posits
the nexus between speech activity and substantive evil. Against
'- Id. at 670 (emphasis added).
By enacting the provisions of the Snydicalism Act the state has declared,
through its legislative body, that to knowingly be or become a member of
or assist in organizing an association to advocate, teach or aid and abet the
commission of crimes or unlawful acts of force, violence or terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political changes, involves such danger
to the public peace and the security of the state, that these acts should be
penalized in the exercise of its police power.
274 U.S. at 371.
268 U.S. at 668-69.
" When Benjamin Gitlow, a former Socialist member of the New York Assem-
bly, and his associates were prosecuted under the Criminal Anarchy Act
for publishing their Left Wing Manifesto, the Supreme Court deferred to
a supposed legislative judgment that their doctrines ... carried with them
enough substantive danger to justify their suppression.
Linde, supra note 12, at 1176.
16 Id. at 1171.
[Vol. 75
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this background, this Article considers different factual patterns
in which this question might arise.
II. FACTUAL PATTERNS OF REGULATION
A. The Conduct-Speech Spectrum
Different combinations of regulable conduct and presump-
tively protected speech run along a spectrum. At one extreme,
exemplified by the factual posture of a "symbolic speech" case,
37
is the situation in which the speaker creates a simultaneous
conduct eviP while engaging in symbolic speech39 which the
government may legitimately regulate. In this situation, the gov-
ernment may impose a restriction on the simultaneously occur-
ring speech activity to regulate the conduct evil. The government,
acting pursuant to a legitimate constitutional power source, 40 has
declared that the speech and the conduct occur simultaneously,
thereby removing any contingency that might exist between the
speech and the conduct evil. If simultaneity of speech and con-
duct exists, there is a one-hundred percent correlation between
the occurrence of the speech and the occurrence of the conduct
See notes 60-106 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 83-100 infra and accompanying text.
'9 As this Court has repeatedly stated, these [first amendment) rights are not
confined to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action
which certainly include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to
protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant
has every right to be, the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities.
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966). See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssIoN 292-98 (1970) (discussing first amendment protection
of various forms of expression and the division between expression and action).
1, The role of the judiciary in ensuring that a legislature has acted within a
legitimate power source was aptly described by Chief Justice Marshall:
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are
prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of
executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not
entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this
tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say
that such an act was not the law of the land.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
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evil, both in time and in logic. Assuming that a legislature is
able to establish such a correlation, a reviewing court would be
hard pressed to invalidate the regulation because of its effect on
speech when such an invalidation would leave the speaker/actor
free to engage in the conduct evil.
Justice Douglas, characterizing picketing as "free speech
plus,"'" asserted "[tihat means that it can be regulated when it
comes to the 'plus' or 'action' side of the protest. It can be
regulated as to the number of pickets and the place and hours
... because traffic and other community problems would oth-
erwise suffer. ''42 In a picketing case, the communicative activity
and the conduct evil are intertwined. They cannot be separated,
so an appropriately narrow state regulation designed to avoid
the conduct evil would be upheld even though it incidentally
impinged upon the speech interests of the picketers. 3
Moving along the spectrum, in some situations the legislature
is not able to establish that the conduct evil happens simulta-
neously with the speech. Sometimes the conduct evil will flow
inevitably from the speech. This fact pattern is reflected by a
case involving a zoning ordinance that dispersed adult movie
theaters based on the assumption that clustering these theaters
would result in an increase in crime and a decrease in property
values." Despite the absence of simultaneity between the speech
and the conduct evil, a court is likely to defer to the legislative
4 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 455 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
', Id. at 455-56.
' Since Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Court has recognized that
peaceful picketing is within the protections of the first amendment. Justice Murphy, in
Thornhill, "was the first to express the doctrine that [peaceful picketing] ... is still
another type of 'liberty' within the Fourteenth Amendment." He stated:
Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation,
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
period. In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that
area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.
Id. at 102 (cited in ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES at 435-
36 (1969)).
See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See also notes 107-
195 infra and accompanying text.
[V/ol. 75
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determination that the conduct evil always follows the speech. 45
Once again, the contingency between the occurrence of speech
and the occurrence of the conduct is removed; here, not through
a showing of simultaneity of the two events, but by a legislative
declaration that the conduct evil always follows the speech. As
in the "symbolic speech" case, the ability of a legislature to
regulate the conduct evil would likely encompass the ability to
restrict the speech that the legislature has determined is a pre-
cursor of the conduct.
Moving away from situations where there is a coincidence
of speech and conduct evil, the appropriate method of analysis
is the clear and present danger test. 46 The factual posture of a
case analyzed under the clear and present danger test differs in
one important way from cases analyzed under the balancing test
used in the first two situations. The main difference is that the
clear and present danger test is used in cases in which the
legislature is unable to establish, by way of a legislative finding,
that the regulable conduct evil will always happen upon the
occurrence of the communicative activity.
Brandenburg v. Ohio,47 probably the leading case in the
area'4 1 presents the prototypical factual situation calling for anal-
ysis under the clear and present danger test. In Brandenburg,
the United States Supreme Court reversed a speaker's conviction
under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute because the statute
proscribed mere advocacy of action, irrespective of whether the
advocacy was "directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and ... [was] likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion. "'49
Implicit in Brandenburg and other versions of the clear and
present danger test 0 is the fact that the legislature has not
" See notes 146-57 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this principle
in the context of Young.
For a discussion of the clear and present danger test, see notes 196-239 infra
and accompanying text.
" 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
" For a discussion of the evolution of the clear and present danger test, see Strong,
Fifty Years of 'Clear and Present Danger. From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond,
1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
" 395 U.S. at 447.
" For a discussion of various formulations of the clear and present danger test,
1986-87]
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established a one-hundred percent correlation between the oc-
currence of the speech and the occurrence of a regulable conduct
evil because it cannot do so.5' The occurrence of the regulable
conduct evil is situationally determined. If circumstances are
right, the conduct evil will follow the speech. If they are not,
nothing happens that is within the regulatory purview of the
legislature. For example, in situations involving certain kinds of
speech, the legislature is unable to remove the contingency that
exists as between the speech activity and the regulable conduct
evil. The conduct evil might follow the speech or it might not.
In these cases, the police, 52 licensing authorities a5 3 or courts54
must determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the government
has shown a sufficient nexus 5 between the speech in question
and the regulable conduct evil.
see Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of
Clear and Present Danger, 70 CALIF. L. RE. 1159 (1982).
1, See 395 U.S. 447-48.
52 For an example of a case in which the decision revolved around the appropri-
ateness of police reaction to a potentially dangerous speech situation, see Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
11 For a useful explanation of first amendment restrictions on the implementation
of licensing schemes, see Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
14 A specific kind of restraint on speech occurs when a speaker is prevented from
speaking by a court injunction or temporary restraining order. See Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
1 Professor Strong discussed the Court's use of the clear and present danger test
as a means of establishing the nexus between speech activity and regulable conduct:
Elevated to constitutional level, the danger test, retaining much of its
original evidentiary flavor, became a device whereby, for legislation to pass
constitutional muster, it must be demonstrated that a permissible objective
of government is imminently and substantially threatened. Permissible ob-
jectives were identified without analysis as "certain substantive evils" with
respect to which government possessed some authority. Yet by the new test
government was empowered to take action only on proof of the immediacy
of serious peril to one or more of those substantive evils. The following
paragraph from the Abrams' dissent specifies the reach of the test as a
potent yet not total construction on governmental power with respect to
utterances:
I never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law
that alone were before this Court in the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk,
and Debs .... were rightly decided. I do not doubt for a moment that
by the same reasoning that would justify punishing persuasion to mur-
der, the United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces
or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring
1986-871 MODERN FREE SPEECH
At this end of the conduct-speech spectrum, there is such a
low correlation between the occurrence of the speech and the
conduct evil that the only tenable method of analysis takes into
account all the variables involved5 6 in the infinite number of
situations that might arise.
Looking at the different factual situations on the conduct-
speech spectrum, it is crucial to keep in mind the legislative or
judicial function in formulating or reviewing statutes or regula-
tions that attempt to regulate speech activity.5 At the legislative
end of the process, one must ask whether a legislature can
legitimately assert that a regulable conduct evil is an inevitable
result of a particular kind of speech activity. Once the statute
or regulation is challenged in court, the threshold question is
whether the court believes that the legislature has made a defen-
sible decision regarding the closeness of the nexus between speech
and conduct.18 Separation of powers and federalism issues come
into play at this point. The question is whether a court should
defer to a legislative determination that speech activity may be
regulated because it bears a close enough connection to some
legislatively regulable conduct evil.
about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States consti-
tutionally may seek to prevent. The power undoubtedly is greater in
time of war than in time of peace because war opens dangers that do
not exist at other times.
Strong, supra note 48, at 46 (citing Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919)).
" For a discussion of the elements of the clear and present danger test, see notes
221-38 infra and accompanying text.
17 Professor Linde addressed the primacy of the legislative function in first amend-
ment analysis:
The first amendment ... is addressed expressly to lawmakers. It is
not, in the first instance, an instruction to courts directing judges to protect
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition. That judicial role indeed
follows from judicial review. But the apprehension expressed in the first
amendment is that legislators might decide to establish a religion, or
prohibit the exercise of another, or suppress disfavored speech or publi-
cations by law, not that executive officers might do so illegally. So the
first amendment forbade Congress to make such laws long before a judicial
role in defining those freedoms was established.
Linde, supra note 12, at 1175.
" Id. at 1171.
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Legislative removal of the contingency between speech activ-
ity and conduct evil is at the heart of the court's analysis of all
situations, from symbolic speech cases to clear and present dan-
ger cases. This analysis not only provides a coherent frame of
reference by which to analyze and synthesize past cases, it also
provides a useful method of analyzing situations likely to be at
the forefront of first amendment law in the future. 9
This Article now turns to an analysis of the major types of
cases running along the speech-conduct spectrum. A close ex-
amination of each will shed some light on the importance of
separation of powers and federalism principles in the free speech
area.
B. United States v. O'Brien
In O'Brien,6° the defendant was convicted in federal district
court for violating the federal statute6' prohibiting the knowing
destruction or mutilation of a draft card. O'Brien burned his
Selective Service registration certificate on the steps of the South
Boston Courthouse in front of a large crowd, including several
FBI agents.62 It is important to note that immediately after the
burning of the draft card, members of the crowd began attacking
O'Brien. 6
19 For an example of a current issue dealing with a legislature's attempt to define
"pornography" as a violation of women's rights, see notes 287-305 infra and accom-
panying text.
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
" The indictment upon which [O'Brien] was tried charged that he "willfully
and knowingly did mutilate, destroy and change by burning ... [his]
Registration Certificate (Selective Service System Form No. 2); in violation
of Title 50, App., United States Code, Section 462(b)." Section 462(b) is
part of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948. Section
462(b)(3), one of six numbered subdivisions of § 462(b), was amended by
Congress in 1965, 79 Stat. 586 (adding the words italicized below), so that
at the time O'Brien burned his certificate an offense was committed by
any person, "who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates,
or in any manner changes any such certificate ......
Id. at 370.
Id. at 369.
Id. For an analysis of this aspect of the case, see note 80 infra and accompanying
[Vol. 75
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In a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, O'Brien64
argued that the provision of the Selective Service Act under
which he was prosecuted was unconstitutional because it was
enacted to abridge free speech and served no legitimate legislative
purpose.6 The district court rejected O'Brien's first amendment
argument and the United States Supreme Court ultimately up-
held that decision. 66
After rejecting O'Brien's argument that the law was facially
invalid as a regulation of speech, 67 the Court turned to his
contention that the law was unconstitutional as applied to him
because his act of burning his registration certificate was pro-
tected "symbolic speech".6 After allowing that O'Brien's activ-
ity was sufficiently communicative to implicate the first amend-
ment,69 the Court noted that it had previously "held that when
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental in-
terest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on first amendment freedoms." ' 7 In setting forth a
four-part balancing approach, 7' the Court stated,
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
64 "The issue of the constitutionality of the 1965 Amendment was raised by counsel
representing O'Brien in a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. At trial and upon
sentencing, O'Brien chose to represent himself. He was represented by counsel on his
appeal to the Court of Appeals." Id. at 370 n.3.
Id. at 370.
See id. at 372.
,, We note at the outset that the 1965 Amendment plainly does not abridge free
speech on its face, and we do not understand O'Brien to argue otherwise.
Amended § 12(b)(3) on its face deals with conduct having no connection
with speech. It prohibits the knowing destruction of certificates issued by
the Selective Service System, and there is nothing necessarily expressive
about such conduct.
Id. at 375.
See id. at 376-82.
- Id. at 376.
'Id.
" Professor Ely considers the first prong of the O'Brien test to be superfluous on
the basis that it is subsumed under prong two, that the government regulation "furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest." Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study
in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV.
L. Ray. 1482, 1483-84 n.10 (1974-75).
1986-871
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important or substantial governmental interest; if the govern-
mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
7 2
The first prong of the O'Brien test is easily met. The Court
stated that the power of Congress to raise and support armies,7 3
including the power to classify and conscript manpower for
military service, is a broad and sweeping power.7 4 Looking at
prongs two and three of the O'Brien test, the question of nexus
between speech and conduct evil becomes relevant. Those two
prongs require that the government have an important or sub-
stantial interest in regulating the symbolic speech and such in-
terest be unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 75
Before looking at the governmental interests in prohibiting
the burning of a draft card, it is important to note that in
O'Brien the symbolic speaker was the one engaged in the conduct
evil proscribed by Congress.7 6 O'Brien was not prosecuted under
the federal law for inciting anyone else to engage in illegal
conduct. 77 The fact that the speaker who, by his symbolic speech,
11 391 U.S. at 377.
7) U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cI. 12.
71 "The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to
make all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping." 391 U.S. at
377 (citing Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755-58 (1948)).
7' For an argument that Congress was, in fact, trying to suppress speech by virtue
of its prohibition of the destruction or mutilation of draft cards, see Alfange, Free
Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
15-16:
On the basis of this legislative history, it is not open to doubt that the
attitude of defiance manifested in the draft-card burnings was what rep-
resented the threat seen by Congress, and that the infuriating offensiveness
of this mode of dissent was what drove Congress to prohibit it. Which is
to say that Congress was engaged in the abridgment of speech when it
enacted the amendment, that O'Brien's First Amendment claims were not
frivolous, and that these claims were entitled to more serious consideration
than they were given by the Court, despite the hatefulness of the ideas
expressed or the infuriating offensiveness of the manner of their expression.
'" See text accompanying note 62 supra.
- If O'Brien had been arrested for creating a breach of the peace in violation of
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engages in the regulable conduct evil makes it possible for Con-
gress to assert a simultaneity between the speech and the conduct
evil. The government may legitimately contend that there is no
time gap and no contingency between the speech and the conduct
evil. This situation is similar to a sit-in,78 or a flag desecration
case 9 in which the protester, by way of his symbolic speech,
engages in some conduct evil that the government may have a
right to prohibit or punish.
This kind of case differs, therefore, from one in which a
speaker engages in some communicative activity that incites an-
other person to engage in a regulable conduct evil. Consider,
for example, 80 that O'Brien was attacked by members of the
crowd immediately after the draft card burning. Assume that
local police officers were present, and at the time of the attack,
they moved forward to arrest O'Brien for violating a state statute
forbidding speaking in such a way as to incite a breach of the
peace. Under this fact pattern, O'Brien would still be engaged
in symbolic speech, but the crowd actually would be engaging
in the conduct evil breaching the peace. There, both a time gap
and a contingency would exist between O'Brien's symbolic speech
and the conduct evil. The crowd takes some time to react, and
it is not certain that they will react at all, let alone in an illegal
way. In this situation, the only acceptable method of regulating
O'Brien's speech would be through use of clear and present
danger principles.
a state statute, he could have been prosecuted under both the federal and state laws.
See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (petitioner's prior conviction under an
Illinois statute for conspiring to injure or destroy the property of another does not bar
a separate indictment and conviction for the same conspiracy based on federal law);
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (petitioner's prior acquittal for a federal offense
of robbing a federally insured bank does not prevent an Illinois prosecution for a
violation of its own penal law on substantially the same evidence).
" See generally Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (reversing the petitioner's
conviction of provoking a breach of the peace by refusing to leave a library that
maintained a segregation policy).
See generally Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (reversing the petition-
er's conviction of improperly using the United States flag by displaying it out an
apartment window with an attached peace symbol).
- See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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The governmental justifications for the Selective Service law
under which O'Brien was prosecuted are now examined. Issues
that should be considered are what the conduct evil is, as well
as who actually engages in the evil, and whether there is any
uncertainty or contingency regarding the occurrence of the con-
duct evil once O'Brien's speech activity has occurred.
In addition to the initial notification, the Court identified
four governmental interests8' advanced by the Selective Service
provision involved in the O'Brien case.82 These purposes were
defeated when O'Brien burned his draft card.8 Congress' artic-
ulation of the interests 84 demonstrates a simultaneity between the
"1 The certificates are proof of registration which allow the Selective Service System
to verify registration and classification of suspected delinquents; the registrant's Selective
Service number and the address of his local board supplied on the certificates further
communication between the registrant and his local board; the certificates serve to remind
the registrant to notify his local board of a change of address or status; the certificates
help detect alterations and forgeries. 391 U.S. at 378-80. See notes 77-85 infra and
accompanying text.
See note 61 supra.
0 We agree that the registration certificate contains much more information of
which the registrant needs to notification. This circumstance, however, does
not lead to the conclusion that the certificate serves no purposes, but that,
like the classification certificate, it serves purposes in addition to initial
notification. Many of these purposes would be defeated by the certificates'
destruction or mutilation. (Emphasis added).
391 U.S. at 378.
See H.R. REP. No. 747, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1965), where the Committee
on Armed Services reported favorably on amending the Universal Military Training and
Service Act of 1951 to include "knowingly destroys" and "knowingly mutilates":
The House Committee on Armed Services is fully aware of, and
shares in, the deep concern expressed throughout the Nation over the
increasing incidences in which individuals and large groups of individuals
openly defy and encourage others to defy the authority of their Government
by destroying or mutilating their draft cards.
While the present provisions of the Criminal Code with respect to the
destruction of Government property may appear broad enough to cover all
acts having to do with the mistreatment of draft cards in the possession of
individuals, the committee feels that in the present critical situation of the
country, the acts of destroying or mutilating these cards are offenses which
pose such a grave threat to the security of the Nation that no question what-
soever should be left as to the intention of Congress that such wanton and
irresponsible acts should be punished (Emphasis added).
But see 111 CONG. REc. 19,871 (1965), where Rep. Rivers, the sponsor of the bill, said:
The purpose of the bill is clear. It merely amends the draft law by
adding the words "knowingly destroys and knowingly mutilates" draft
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symbolic speech and the conduct evil addressed by the statute.
If simultaneity between speech and conduct evil exists, then a
one-iundred percent correlation exists between the exercise of
the communicative activity and the creation of the conduct evil.
The Court declared that the issuance of registration and
eligibility classification certificates was "a legitimate and sub-
stantial administrative aid in the functioning of [the Selective
Service] system"8 and characterized the statute in O'Brien16 as
"legislation to insure the continuing availability of issued certif-
icates, ' 7 generally serving a substantial purpose in the system's
administration. When O'Brien burned his draft card, he frus-
trated the general purpose of protecting the administration of
the Selective Service System"8 and the four specific purposes of
the law.
The Court accepted the government's argument that availa-
bility of the registration and eligibility certificates "relieves the
Selective Service System of the administrative burden it would
otherwise have in verifying the registration and classification of
cards. A person who is convicted would be subject to a fine up to $10,000
or imprisonment up to 5 years. It is a straightforward clear answer to those
who would make a mockery of our efforts in South Vietnam by engaging
in the mass destruction of draft cards.
We do not want to make it illegal to mutilate or destroy a card per se,
because sometimes this can happen by accident. But if it can be proved that
a person knowingly destroyed or mutilated his draft card, then under the com-
mittee proposal, he can be sent to prison, where he belongs. This is the least
we can do for our men in South Vietnam fighting to preserve freedom, while
a vocal minority in this country thumb their noses at their own government.
(Emphasis added).
See also id. at 20,433 where Sen. Thurmond remarked:
The President has acknowledged that our country is engaged in a war.
Attempts to interfere with the Universal Military Training Act or service
in the Armed Forces constitutes treason in time of war. Such conduct as
public burnings of draft cards and public pleas for persons to refuse to
register for their draft should not and must not be tolerated by a society
whose sons, brothers, and husbands are giving their lives in defense of
freedom and countrymen against Communist aggression.
391 U.S. at 377.
'" See note 61 supra.
391 U.S. at 377-78.
See note 81 supra.
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all suspected delinquents." 89 Focusing on the availability of the
certificates, the Court emphasized that because the certificates
are in the nature of "receipts," indicating that the registrant has
complied with the law, "it was in the interest of the administra-
tion of the system that they be continually available, in case,
for example, of a filing error."' 9 The important point is that
the Court accepted the government's arguments regarding the
continued availability of the draft certificates. If availability is
the salient feature of the regulatory scheme, then destruction or
mutilation of the certificates serves immediately to defeat this
specific purpose of the statute and, therefore, simultaneity exists
between the burning of the draft card and the impairment of
one of the legitimate goals of the Selective Service System.
A second rationale of the law under which O'Brien was
convicted is that "[tihe information supplied on the certificates
facilitates communication between registrants and local boards,
simplifying the system and benefiting all concerned." 9' There-
fore, the availability of the draft certificate is important so a
registrant may communicate his number to his local board when
he supplies or requests information. 92 The Court also accepted
the argument that continued availability of the draft certificates
allows a local board, other than the registrant's own local draft
board, to answer questions regarding the registrant's eligibility
status. Absent the certificates, the board's ability to answer the
registrant's question "would be considerably complicated." 93 The
lack of availability caused by burning the draft card frustrates
the communication between the registrant and his own or an-
other local draft board. The Court, therefore, accepted the
legislative presumption that, because the destruction of some
draft certificates might impair the functioning of the Selective
Service System, Congress can prohibit all registrants from mu-
tilating or destroying their Selective Service certificates. 94
19 391 U.S. at 378.




- Contra Alfange, supra note 75, at 15:
When a war protester burns his draft card, he does so entirely because of
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A third justification for the requirement of continual avail-
ability of Selective Service certificates is that they "carry contin-
ual reminders that the registrant must notify his local board of
any change of address, and other specified changes in his sta-
tus." 95 In terms of the destruction of the certificates causing an
immediate disruption of the system, the Court asserted that "the
destruction of certificates deprives the system of a potentially
useful notice device." 96 Again, this conduct evil, regulated by
Congress in its powers over the military occurs simultaneously
with the symbolic speech activity of burning one's draft card.
Congress posited, and the Court accepted, a simultaneity of
occurrence between the symbolic speech activity and the regul-
able conduct evil.
97
The fourth purpose that the prohibition against destruction
of Selective Service certificates advances is to enhance the detec-
tion of the alteration, forgery, or other deceptive misuse of the
draft certificates. 9 Continual availability is an aid to insuring
the preservation of draft certificates in their original condition.
Mutilation or destruction of the certificates immediately destroys
the opportunity of Selective Service authorities to use this par-
ticular means of detecting and tracing abuses of the system.
Examination of the four congressional interests illustrates
that O'Brien engaged in the proscribed conduct evil by virtue of
his symbolic speech activity. As Congress posited and the Court
accepted, the destruction of draft certificates impairs the smooth
functioning of the Selective Service System.9 Thus, it follows
that complete congruence exists between the occurrence of the
the value of the act as expression. The burning has never been intended as
a means of interfering with the draft, not because the protesters have no
desire to interfere with the draft, but because it has seemed obvious that
the destruction of an individual's draft card could have no tangible ob-
structive effect.
"1 391 U.S. at 379.
-1 Id.
' See note 84 supra.
391 U.S. at 379-80.
"We think it apparent that the continuing availability to each registrant of his
Selective Service certificates substantially furthers the smooth and proper functioning of
the system that Congress has established to raise armies." Id. at 381.
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symbolic speech activity and the conduct evil that Congress may
regulate. The Court espoused that "When O'Brien deliberately
rendered unavailable his registration certificate, he wilfully frus-
trated this governmental interest."'' 1
The Court asserted that O'Brien was convicted solely for his
conduct and not for his speech activity.'0 The Court was careful
to distinguish O'Brien from cases "where the alleged govern-
mental interest in regulating conduct arises in some measure
because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is
itself thought to be harmful."'0 2
Although a law that restricts speech based solely on the
government's disagreement with or dislike for the speech would
violate constitutional principles of content neutrality, 103 absence
of governmental animus does nothing to protect the rights of a
speaker such as O'Brien. As long as a government asserts and
a reviewing court accepts a legitimate content-neutral purpose
for the law, a plaintiff will be precluded from any effective
protection for his right to speak in the manner he chooses.1°
The Court's unwillingness to inquire into the Congressional mo-
tive for passing the law in O'Brien'05 suggests that once a court
defers to the legislative statement of a conduct-related, content-
neutral purpose for the law, the court's review role is completed.
The more deference a court shows to a legislative finding of
'o Id. at 382.
W° "In other words, both the governmental interest and the operation of the 1965
Amendment are limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct .... For
[the] noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else, he was convicted."
Id. at 381-82.
2 Id. at 382 (citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)).
"OS The "content neutrality" rule essentially means that a government may not
restrict or punish speech based solely on disagreement with or hostility to the content
of a given communication. For a discussion of this principle, see Redish, The Content
Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113 (1981-82); Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WVi. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983-84).
"[B]oth the governmental interest and the operation of the 1965 Amendment
are limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct. The governmental
interest and the scope of the 1965 Amendment are limited to preventing harm to the
smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective Service System." 391 U.S. at 381-82.
101 "It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike
down an otherwise 'constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive." Id. at 383.
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simultaneity between conduct evil and speech, the more likely a
court will uphold the statute and its incidental restrictions on
the rights of speakers. To whatever extent the Court is willing
to accept a legislative finding regarding the nexus between con-
duct evil and speech, as a function of separation of powers and
federalism,'10 the result will be a diminution of the protections
available to those wishing to disseminate their views.
C. Young v. American Mini Theatres
In Young v. American Mini Theatres,0 7 the legislative asser-
tion of a nexus between regulable conduct evil and speech is
certainly more tenuous than in O'Brien.08 An important question
to consider in the context of Young is whether the O'Brien
balancing approach is an appropriate method of analysis, based
on the nature of the legislative findings accepted by the Court
as justification for the ordinance in question. In Young,"09 the
Court examined the issue of whether zoning ordinances that the
Detroit Common Council had passed were unconstitutional be-
cause they were based on the content of movies protected by the
first amendment. Instead of concentrating "adult" theaters in
limited zones," 0 the Detroit ordinances required that such thea-
ters be dispersed a certain distance from residential areas or
other regulated uses."' An important aspect of the Detroit reg-
1* For the position that the normal deference a court shows to a legislature should
not apply in first amendment cases, see Linde, supra note 12, at 1181:
In judicial review of legislation not affected by the first amendment,
deference to the factual assumptions presumed to underlie the legislative
prescription, no matter how fictitious or anachronistic those assumptions
are, rightly reflects the constitutional allocation of power. But such con-
ventions of limited judicial review are inappropriate to first amendment
cases. If present danger is to be a prerequisite to punishing speech, there
is no room for deference to a past legislative assessment of danger.
427 U.S. 50 (1976).
See notes 114-16 infra and accompanying text.
427 U.S. at 50.
For a case that upheld the validity of city zoning ordinances that had the effect
of requiring all adult motion picture theaters, as defined in the ordinances, to be located
in certain downtown areas, see Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979).
M' 427 U.S. at 52. See id. at n.3 for a discussion of regulated uses.
1986-87]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75
ulatory scheme was that the classification of a theater as "adult"
was based on the character of the movies it exhibits." 2
For purposes of the separation of powers and federalism
analysis, one must note that a city council, not Congress or a
state legislature, made the findings that support the zoning or-
dinance that incidentally restricts freedom of speech." 3 One must
focus on the conduct evil addressed by the Detroit Common
Council, including the questions of who engages in the conduct
evil, and whether it occurs simultaneously with the speech or
flows from the speech at some time after the speech activity has
begun.
The 1972 ordinances requiring the dispersal of adult theaters
were amendments to an "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance" which the
Council had originally adopted in 1962. "4 "At that time the
Detroit Common Council made a finding that some uses of
property are especially injurious to a neighborhood when they
are concentrated in limited areas.'" Articulating the rationale
Id. at 53.
,' For a discussion of reasons why a reviewing court should not show great
deference to a legislative finding connecting speech activity and substantive evil, see
generally Linde, supra note 12, at 1179-82. Specifically, Professor Linde contends:
It is unrealistic to sustain laws directed in terms against expression on
the basis of deference to a greater capacity of the legislative than the
judicial process to assess the danger of the proscribed expression. Most
laws are not a one-time solution to an immediate problem; most are, in
terms, permanent. The most conscientious legislation is at best a diagnosis
made today and a prescription for the indefinite future .... But unlike
adjudication (by court or agency), the legislative process requires no oblig-
atory link between the lawmakers' decision and the factual premises ....
But even if the legislative findings which are given deference are the true
premises of the legislative action, for what length of time can such findings
provide the predicate of "danger," if that is constitutionally required? Are
the laws that were sustained 10 years ago by deference to congressional
findings of 20 years ago still constitutional today? And when we turn from
Congress to state legislatures and city councils, the premise of superior
capacity to predict future danger from the content of speech or press
becomes even more attenuated.
Id. at 1180.
427 U.S. at 54.
" Id. The ordinance provided in part:
In the development and execution of this Ordinance, it is recognized that
there are some uses which, because of their very nature, are recognized as
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proffered by the Common Council for the dispersal of adult
theaters, the Court stated:
In the opinion of the urban planners and real estate experts
who supported the ordinances, the location of several such
businesses in the same neighborhood tends to attract an un-
desirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects
property values, causes an increase in crime, especially prosti-
tution, and encourages residents and businesses to move else-
where."1
6
Discussing Detroit's interest in preserving the character of its
neighborhoods, Justice Stevens" 7 espoused a very deferential role
for the Court in scrutinizing the findings of the Common Coun-
cil:
It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of [the Common
Council's] decision to require adult theaters to be separated
rather than concentrated in the same areas .... [T]he city's
interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is
one that must be accorded high respect." 8
Because the Court was dealing with a zoning ordinance," 9 it
relied on separation of powers and federalism' 20 principles to
having serious objectionable operational characteristics, particularly when
several of them are concentrated under certain circumstances thereby having
a deleterious effect upon the adjacent areas. Special regulation of these
uses is necessary to insure that these adverse effects will not contribute to
the blighting or downgrading of the surrounding neighborhood.
Id. at n.6.
I ld. at 55.
"7 This discussion is in Part III of Justice Stevens' opinion. Only Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist joined Part III.
427 U.S. at 71.
"" Since Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Court has applied
a very deferential standard in its review of zoning laws, requiring only that the law have
a rational relationship to a permissible state objective.
10 ,, ... [T]he record discloses a factual basis for the Common Council's conclu-
sion that this kind of restriction will have the desired effect. It is not our function to
appraise the wisdom of its decision to require adult theatres to be separated rather than
concentrated in the same areas .... 427 U.S. at 71.
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apply rational basis scrutiny to the ordinances. 2' The Court
adopted a level of judicial scrutiny which allowed the city of
Detroit great leeway in determining how to go about "preserving
the character of its neighborhoods." ' The Court accepted the
contention of the Common Council that a causal connection
existed between the concentration of adult theaters and the de-
terioration of the surrounding neighborhoods.1n Thus, the Court
accepted the council's argument that a one-hundred percent cor-
relation existed between the speech activity and the conduct evil
that the council tried to prevent. 24 In this sense, the Court's
analysis is the same as that of the four-part O'Brien balancing
test. 125
Justice Powell, concurring in Young, analyzed that Young
"present[s] an example of innovative land-use regulation, impli-
cating First Amendment concerns only incidentally and to a
limited extent.' 26 He concluded that it was appropriate to ana-
lyze the council's action under the four-part test of United States
v. O'Brien. 27 Justice Powell contended that "[t]he factual dis-
tinctions between a prosecution for destruction of a Selective
Service registration certificate, as in O'Brien, and . . . [the facts
of Young] are substantial, but the essential weighing and bal-
ancing of competing interests are the same."'
' 28
After characterizing the case as involving primarily a land-
use regulation, 29 Justice Powell stated that "the legislative judg-
ment is to control in cases in which the validity of a particular
zoning regulation is 'fairly debatable.' "130 He agreed with Jus-
tice Stevens that "the Council was motivated by its perception
I"1 "Moreover, the city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment
with solutions to admittedly serious problems." Id.
12- Id.
'2 Id. "The Common Council's determination was that of a concentration of
'adult' movie theatres causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime, effects
which are not attributable to theatres showing other types of films." Id. at n.34.
4 Id. at 73.
'21 See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
'16 427 U.S. at 73.
121 Id. at 79.
2 Id. at 80.
"-, Id. at 73.
11 Id. at 74.
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that the 'regulated uses,' when concentrated, worked a 'delete-
rious effect upon the adjacent area' and could 'contribute to the
blighting or downgrading of the surrounding neighborhood.' "'s'1
He asserted that the zoning ordinance challenged in Young "re-
sulted directly from the Common Council's determination that
the recent proliferation of these establishments and their tend-
ency to cluster in certain parts of the city would have the adverse
effect upon the surrounding areas that the ordinance was aimed
at preventing.'
' 32
Characterizing Young as a case of first impression before
the Supreme Court,' 33 Justice Powell insisted that "this situation
is not analogous to cases involving expression in public forums
or to those involving individual expression or, indeed, to any
other prior case."' 3 4 To evaluate his claim that Young is distin-
guishable from all other cases, one must look closely at the first
amendment issues that he identified in Young. Justice Powell's
primary concern was "that there be full opportunity for expres-
sion in all of its varied forms to convey a desired message."
'' 3s
His secondary concern was "that there be full opportunity for
everyone to receive the message."'
' 36
A potentially serious defect lurks in Justice Powell's defini-
tional system. While defining the first amendment interests as
encompassing both a right to disseminate and a right to receive
the message, he shifted his level of abstraction from the group
to the individual level. Discussing the rights of movie theater
owners, he spoke of the marketplace in general terms, ignoring
the individual interests of specific theater owners. 37 Although it
"' Id. at 74-75.
" ld. at 75.
'" "This is the first case in this Court in which the interests in free expression
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments have been implicated by a munici-




'" In this case, there is no indication that the application of the Anti-Skid Row
Ordinance to adult theatres has the effect of suppressing production of or,
to any significant degree, restricting access to adult movies. The Nortown
[theatre] concededly will not be able to exhibit adult movies at its present
location, and the ordinance limits the potential location of the proposed
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may be true that, in relation to the market as a whole, "Detroit
has silenced no message, has invoked no censorship," 3 8 it cannot
be contended that the first amendment rights of the individual
theater owners are protected under the ordinance. When Justice
Powell refered to "the opportunity for a message to reach an
audience,"' 3 9 one must question what is being protected-the
message or the speaker? If the first amendment protects only
the message, as Justice Powell seemed to argue, then the rights
of an individual speaker may be abridged, as long as other
speakers comprise a judicially-defined marketplace of acceptable
size. It does not help to tell individual speakers who are silenced
that constitutional protections are observed because other speak-
ers have the right to disseminate their messages.'14 Although
there is no "significant overall curtailment of adult movie pres-
entations, or the opportunity for a message to reach an audi-
ence,' 4' the ability of an individual speaker to communicate is
not protected. Justice Powell contended, however, that "some
prospective patrons may be inconvenienced by this dispersal. But
other patrons, depending upon where they live or work, may
find it more convenient to view an adult movie when adult
theaters are not concentrated in a particular section of the city."'1
42
The interests of viewers in general, or of one viewer in
particular, may be protected under the dispersal program in a
way that the interests of speakers cannot. While viewers' access
to the offered materials is not diminished, the access of a par-




1 Id. at 79.
'" Justice Stewart makes the same point in his dissent:
The Court stresses that Detroit's content-based regulatory system does
not preclude altogether the display of sexually oriented films. But, as the
Court noted in a similar context in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), ... this is constitutionally irrelevant, for
"one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."
Id. at 86 n.6.




Thus defining the first amendment interests, Justice Powell
concluded that, "[i]n these circumstances, it is appropriate to
analyze the permissibility of Detroit's action under the four-part
test of United States v. O'Brien."'1 43 In considering the appro-
priateness of applying the O'Brien test to the facts of Young,
one should ask whether Justice Powell was more correct when
he said that Young "is not analogous ... to any other prior
case.'99 44 Looking at the facts of the two cases, there is a strong
argument that Young is sufficiently distinguishable from O'Brien
to preclude analysis of the Detroit zoning ordinances under the
four-part O'Brien balancing test.
In each case, the legislature established that the conduct evil
would always happen upon the occurrence of the speech activ-
ity. 45 In O'Brien, Congress concluded that destruction of a draft
card automatically frustrated the purposes of the Selective Serv-
ice Act amendment under which the defendant was prosecuted. 146
Congress posited, and the Court accepted, simultaneity of oc-
currence of the speech activity and the conduct evil. In Young,
the Common Council determined that the deterioration of neigh-
borhoods always followed the clustering of adult movie thea-
ters. 47 As in O'Brien, the legislature removed any doubt about
the conduct evil attending the speech activity.'48 Unlike O'Brien,
however, the Common Council did not assert that there existed
a simultaneous occurrence of the speech activity and the conduct
evil. Rather, the legislature asserted an inevitability of the con-
duct evil occurring once the particular speech activity occurred. "49
In O'Brien there was no time gap between the symbolic
speech activity and the frustration of the purposes of the Selec-
tive Service System. With no time gap, and therefore no doubt
''Id.
Id. at 76.
See notes 146 and 149 infra.
'. For a discussion of the governmental purposes offered in support of the federal
statute in O'Brien, see notes 85-100 supra and accompanying text.
,,' 427 U.S. at 74-75.
"' See note 87 supra.
As Justice Powell asserted in his concurrence in Young: "Those amendments
resulted directly from the Common Council's determination that the recent proliferation
of these establishments and their tendency to cluster in certain parts of the city would
have the adverse effect upon the surrounding areas that the ordinance was aimed at
preventing." 427 U.S. at 75.
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as to the occurence of the conduct evil, it does not make sense
to employ the clear and present danger test as the method of
analysis. 50 A clear and present danger analysis is not indicated
by the facts of O'Brien because the "presentness" element of
the test, dealing with imminency of conduct evil in relation to
speech,' 5' is compressed to the point of simultaneity. It makes
no sense to talk about how quickly conduct follows speech if
the legislature has conclusively determined that the speech activ-
ity and the conduct evil happen at the same time.5 2
A major distinction between O'Brien and Young is the party
who actually engages in the conduct evil. Identifying the evildoer
is important when considering the accuracy of the legislative
determination that the regulable conduct evil always accompanies
the speech activity. In O'Brien, 53 the speaker himself, by way
of his symbolic speech activity, engaged in the conduct evil of
frustrating the purposes of the Selective Service System.' 4 Be-
cause O'Brien himself engaged in the conduct evil at the same
time he was communicating, the nexus between his speech activ-
ity and the regulable conduct evil is obvious and direct. In
Young, however, it is not the theater owners who engage in the
criminal activity or ruination of neighborhoods. Rather, it is
some other group allegedly attracted to a collection of adult
movie theaters.' As soon as it is argued that it is not the
speaker who engages in the conduct evil, but some group that
does not even necessarily patronize the adult movie theaters, there
is a less direct connection between the regulated speech activity
and the conduct evil. The fact that someone other than the
speaker engages in the regulable conduct evil makes it more
difficult for the legislature to establish a sufficiently high cor-
relation between the speech and the conduct evil.
A majority in Young ignored these differences and empha-
sized instead the power of the Detroit Common Council to
' For a discussion of this point, see notes 37-43 supra and accompanying text.
' For a discussion of the clear and present danger test, see Linde, supra note 12;
Redish, supra note 50; Strong, supra note 48.
2 See notes 13-35 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 38 and 43 supra for a discussion of the concept of "symbolic speech."
See notes 83-100 supra and accompanying text.
427 U.S. at 55.
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regulate the speech activity under the guise of land-use regula-
tion.5
6
The dissenters, 57 however, were aware of the difficulties
inherent in accepting the legislative removal of the contingency
between the regulated speech activity and the conduct evil. Jus-
tice Stewart, in his dissent,5 8 argued that Young involved "the
constitutional permissibility of selective interference with pro-
tected speech'59 whose content is thought to produce distasteful
effects."'"60 The operative question is how convincingly the De-
troit Common Council demonstrated the causal connection be-
tween the kind of speech regulated and the "distasteful effects."
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent,' 6' argued that for reasons of
vagueness and overbreadth, 62 the Detroit ordinance did not es-
'° Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in Young. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist joined his opinion in toto. Justice Powell
concurred in Parts I and II but wrote separately to express his disagreement with Part
III of Justice Stevens' opinion and to clarify his approach to the case.
" Justice Stewart dissented in Young, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun. Justice Blackmun also dissented, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and
Marshall.
427 U.S. at 84.
' See id. at 85 n.3 (citing American Mini-Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014,
1019 (1975) (no regulatory provision for judicial determination of obscenity, therefore
the material must be presumed to be protected by the first amendment)).
Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
Id. at 88.
"' For an excellent discussion of the difference between the vagueness and over-
breadth doctrines, see M. NacAER, NImnAR ON FREEDOM OF SPEEcH § 4.11[E] (1984):
In a number of decisions the Supreme Court has used the terms
"vagueness" and "overbreadth" interchangeably, or otherwise treated the
terms as if they referred to the same concept. In its more carefully reasoned
opinions, however, the Court has recognized the very different concepts
that the two terms encompass. Zwickler v. Koota, [389 U.S. 241 (1967)],
for example, makes the point that a statute is void for vagueness if it
" 'either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application ... .' " On the other hand, a statute may be
defective for overbreadth although it is "lacking [in] neither clarity nor
precision ..... " It may, nevertheless be "void for 'overbreadth,' . . . [in]
that it offends the constitutional principle that 'a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.' "
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tablish the requisite nexus between the kind of speech activity
sought to be regulated and the conduct evil which the legislature
has a right to prevent. He contended that the ordinance was
intrinsically vague because the presence of sufficiently clustered
regulated uses cannot be determined with any degree of cer-
tainty. 63 The first question in analyzing a statute as unconsti-
tutionally vague is whether it contains sufficiently precise
standards to apprise a person that he may be subject to the
regulatory impact of the statute.' 64 Justice Blackmun made a
compelling case that a theater owner is not adequately put on
notice of when his theater is being used for presenting'6 movies
that are "distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on"'
'
certain, statutorily-defined sexual activities or anatomical areas.' 67
In addition, to avoid being within 1,000 feet of another regulated
use, a theater owner must continually apply the statutory defi-
nitions to himself and his neighbors. As Justice Blackmun as-
serted: "At any moment [a theater owner] could become a
violator of the ordinance because some neighbor has slipped into
a 'regulated use' classification."' 68 The second aspect of the
vagueness problem "is the tendency of vague statutory stan-
dards to grant excessive and effectively unreviewable discre-
63 427 U.S. at 89-90.
"" In Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
explained that the "void for vagueness" doctrine "incorporates the notions of fair notice
or warning .... It requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforce-
ment officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.' " Id. at 572-73.
63 427 U.S. at 89.
"- Id.
167 Id.
"'1 Id. In addition, Justice Blackmun comments:
He must know, for example, if the adjacent hotel has opened a bar or
shoeshine "parlor" on the premises, though he may still be uncertain
whether the hotel as a whole constitutes more than one "regulated use."
He must also know the moment when the stock in trade of neighboring
bookstores and theatres comes to be of such a character, and predomi-
nance, as to render them "adult." Lest he let down his guard, he should
remember that if he miscalculates on any of these issues, he may pay a
fine or go to jail.
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tion to the officials who enforce those standards."' 69 After de-
tailing the licensing procedures mandated by the Detroit
ordinance, 70 Justice Blackmun argued that the licensing scheme,
in its vagueness and overbreadth, 71 constituted a prior restraint
on the speech activities of individual theater owners. 72
Justice Blackmun's dissent may be characterized as objecting
to the definitional system inherent in the Detroit ordinance be-
cause it failed to establish, with sufficient clarity, the conditions
under which the regulable conduct evil may occur. 73 The Detroit
Common Council's assertion of a nexus between a certain kind
of speech activity and a regulable conduct evil depends on the
accurate, narrow definition of the precedent factual conditions
necessary for creation of the conduct evil. If a theater owner
cannot tell when he or his neighbor is operating a "regulated
use," how can he tell when two of the "regulated uses" are
within a certain distance of each other?
Given the definitional problems alone, there are serious prob-
lems in the argument that the Detroit Common Council estab-
lished a high enough correlation between the occurrence of a
certain kind of speech activity and a regulable conduct evil. At
least in O'Brien, where the speaker himself created the conduct
evil when he burned his draft card, the legislature was able to
identify a certain speech activity that directly impaired the draft
system. 74 In Young, even though it may have been possible to
define the speech that resulted in the regulable conduct evil, the
statute did not provide for an acceptable method of determining
when regulated uses existed, let alone when they were sufficiently
clustered to create the presumption of causing the deterioration
of surrounding neighborhoods. 7 1
Id. at 91.
Id. at 91-94.
" See note 162 supra for definitions of vagueness and overbreadth.
" 427 U.S. at 91 n.4 (power of city officials to grant or deny licenses or waive
the 1000-foot rule constituted prior restraint and the ordinance was subject to challenge
on that ground alone).
"' See id. at 89-90.
, See note 154 supra.
"' See 427 U.S. at 89-90.
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Considering the factual and analytical differences between
O'Brien and Young, 76 one must ask why a majority of the
Court showed such deference to the findings of the Detroit
Common Council that the clustering of "regulated uses" nec-
essarily results in the deterioration of neighborhoods. The an-
swer, in large part, must lie in notions of separation of powers
and federalism. 77 Characterizing the Detroit ordinance as simply
a zoning or land-use regulation, 78 the Court showed its usual
deference to local ordinances or statutes that regulate in these
areas. 79 According to Justice Powell, the theater owners' attack
on the Detroit ordinance focused on the argument "that it is
the 'character of the right, not of the limitation' which governs
the standard of judicial review ... and that zoning regulations
therefore have no talismanic immunity from constitutional chal-
lenge."' 10 Justice Powell and the majority rejected this argument
and accorded primary significance to the nature of the limitation
as a zoning or land-use regulation.' 8' The free speech interests
of individual theater owners clearly were superseded by the police
power interests of the City of Detroit in maintaining the quality
of its neighborhoods. As Justice Blackmun argued in his dissent:
This may be a permissible way to control pawnshops, pool
halls, and the other "regulated uses" for which the ordinance
was originally designed. It is not an acceptable way, in the
"76 See notes 153-62 supra and accompanying text for a general discussion of the
differences between these cases.
1" Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in TVA v. Hill stated:
Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each branch
having certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. While
"[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is," . . . it is equally-and emphatically-the exclusive
province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and
mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority
for the Nation. Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided
the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer
the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.
437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
178 See notes 114-21 supra and accompanying text.
' See note 119 supra.
'' 427 U.S. at 75.
See id. at 73-74 (Justice Powell) and 62-63 (majority).
[Vol. 75
MODERN FREE SPEECH
light of the First Amendment's presence, to decide who will
be permitted to exhibit what films in what places.'
82
Despite whatever intrinsic merit Justice Blackmun's argument
might have, it was soundly rejected by the Supreme Court in
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 
3
In Renton, the Court, through Justice Rehnquist,' 84 rejected
a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance passed by the
City of Renton, Washington. "[The ordinance] prohibits adult
motion picture theaters"" from locating within 1,000 feet of any
residential zone, single or multiple family dwelling, church, park,
or school.'
' s8 6
Relying strongly on Young v. American Mini-Theatres,87 the
Court concluded that, although the Renton ordinance only af-
fects theaters that show adult motion pictures, it was constitu-
tional because its primary focus "is aimed not at the content
of the films shown at 'adult motion picture theaters,' but rather
at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding
community."'"
The "secondary effects" of concentrating adult movie thea-
ters were the same as those identified in Young: an increase in
crime, a decrease in the city's retail trade, a decrease in property
values, and a general deterioration of the quality of urban life. 89
'2 Id. at 94.
106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
" Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices White, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun concurred
separately. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall.
' The Court found no vagueness problems with the City of Renton's definition
of "adult motion picture theater":
The term "adult motion picture theater" was defined as "lain enclosed
building used for presenting motion picture films, video cassettes, cable
television, or any other such visual media, distinguished or characteri[zed]
by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'specified
sexual activities' or 'specified anatomical areas' ... for observation by
patrons therein."
106 S. Ct. at 927.
106 S. Ct. at 926.
" See notes 107-82 supra and accompanying text.
106 S. Ct. at 929 (emphasis in original).
"" Id. Cf. note 116 supra and accompanying text.
1986-87]
KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
These are the substantive "non-speech" evils that the Renton
City Council identified as accompanying the concentration of
adult movie theaters near the regulated uses listed in the ordi-
nance.
The important question in this case is how the Renton City
Council established the nexus between the concentration of adult
movie theaters and the substantive evils it wished to prevent. It
must be emphasized that the Renton ordinance was enacted
without the benefit of any studies specifically relating to the
particular problems or needs of Renton." ' Rather, "Renton
relied heavily on the experience of, and studies produced by, the
City of Seattle."'1'
In upholding this method of establishing causality between
regulated speech and substantive evil, the Court said:
We hold that Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences
of Seattle and other cities ... in enacting its adult theater
zoning ordinance. The First Amendment does not require a
city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies
or produce evidence independent of that already generated by
other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon
is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the
city addresses. 92
Justice Brennan took strong exception to the method of
regulation approved by the majority:
The Court's approach largely immunizes such measures from
judicial scrutiny, since a municipality can readily find other
"' Id. The court of appeals found that Renton's interests in the ordinance were
"conclusory and speculative" because the "ordinance was enacted without the benefit
of studies relating to" the particular problems or needs of Renton. Id. (citing 748 F.2d
at 537).
,9, Id. "In Seattle, as in Renton, the adult theater zoning ordinance was aimed at
preventing the secondary effects caused by the presence of even one such theater in a
given neighborhood." Id. (citing Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153 (Wash.
S. Ct. 1978)).
,91 06 U.S. at 931.
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municipal ordinances to rely upon, thus always retrospectively
justifying special zoning regulations for adult theaters. 93
Justice Brennan's point is well taken. The fact remains that
a zoning ordinance such as Renton's does affect speech in an
important way and to a significant degree. The majority purports
to protect those speech interests by applying "time, place, and
manner" standards to the ordinance in question.' 94
One of the requirements for a valid "time, place, or manner"
regulation is that it serve a "substantial governmental inter-
est."' 95 This is an absolutely specious requirement if cities are
able to rely on "evidence" from other locations that they rea-
sonably believe is relevant to the prevention of the substantive
evil the city is trying to prevent. The majority has created a free-
floating justification for any city that wishes to pass a zoning
ordinance that is based, at least in part, on the content of the
speech regulated.
Renton reflects an ever-increasing deference by the Court to
zoning ordinances that regulate on the basis of the content of
speech. The Court's review role is now limited to determining
whether a city council had a reasonable belief that conditions in
some other location might be relevant to the city's problems of
crime or property devaluation.
In the zoning area, the Court has made it extremely easy for
a city council to establish the nexus between a certain kind of
speech and regulable substantive evils. It is hard to imagine how
a city council could fail to meet the "standards" set forth by
the Court in Renton.
Moving into more general areas of speech regulation, this
Article now examines the clear and present danger test, and its
method of establishing the link between speech and substantive
evil.
'"' Id. at 936.
'" Id. at 933.
' Id. at 928 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984); Heffron
v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981)).
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III. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST
A. Brandenburg v. Ohio'96
In Brandenburg, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader convicted under the
Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for " 'advocat[ing] ... the
duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing
industrial or political reform' and for 'voluntarily assembl[ing]
with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to
teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.' "197
The problem with the statute was that it defined "the crime in
terms of mere advocacy not distinguished from incitement to
imminent lawless action.' 98 Basing its decision on the failure of
the Ohio statute to draw this distinction,199 the Court ruled:
[Tjhe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action. 200
A statute that does not incorporate these clear and present
danger principles suffers from both first and fourteenth amend-
ment problems.2"' At least in the context of advocacy of force
or violence, the clear and present danger test provides standards
which serve to notify potential speakers of what kind of speech
is regulable, 20 2 and serves to guide the government authorities in
the application of the statute. 203 Incorporation of these principles
1- 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
'19 Id. at 444-45 (citing OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2923.13 (Page 1953) (repealed
1974)).
Id. at 448-49.
"Statutes affecting the right of assembly, like those touching on freedom of
speech, must observe the established distinctions between mere advocacy and incitement
to imminent lawless action." Id. at 449 n.4.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 448.
See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
201 See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
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in a statute that attempts to regulate certain kinds of speech also
avoids the overbreadth2 problem of the statute "sweep[ing]
within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has im-
munized from governmental control."20
Brandenburg represents the culmination of a long line of
cases developing the clear and present danger test.206 In his
concurrence in Brandenburg, Justice Douglas sketched the evo-
lution of clear and present danger from its inception in the
Espionage Act cases of 1919.207
In the first of these cases, Schenck v. United States,20 the
Court sustained the conviction of a defendant charged with
attempts to cause insubordination in the military and obstruction
I Although a person charged with violation of a governmental restriction on
speech has himself engaged in speech which is unprotected under the First
Amendment, he may nevertheless assert as a defense the invalidity of the
restriction if such restriction is sufficiently broad so as also to prohibit speech
which is protected under the First Amendment. The restriction as applied to
the given facts may be perfectly constitutional, but it is nevertheless "over-
broad," or invalid "on its face," for the reason that its reach also extends
to protected speech. In such circumstances the person charged with viola-
tion of the restriction has standing to assert the invalidity of the entire
statute (or other restriction) notwithstanding the fact that his speech is not
in itself constitutionally protected.
M. NmnmR, supra note 162, at § 4.11[A].
395 U.S. at 448.
: See Strong, supra note 48.
In addition to Schenck v. U.S., discussed infra at notes 208-27 and accompanying
text, the Supreme Court decided two other Espionage Act cases in 1919:
One week after writing the Schenck opinion Holmes wrote two other
opinions for the Court affirming convictions in similar cases. In Frohwerk
v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), he stated that: '[ihe First Amend-
ment while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such cannot have
been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible
use of language.... Whatever might be thought of the other counts on
the evidence, if it were before us, we have decided in Schenck v. United
States, that a person may be convicted of a conspiracy to obstruct recruiting
by words of persuasion.' 249 U.S. at 206.
In Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), Holmes affirmed the conviction of
Eugene Debs, a prominent Socialist of the time, for allegedly encouraging listeners to
obstruct the recruiting service. Holmes in this case spoke more in common law speech
terms which were adopted later by the Court (but not by Holmes) in the ... Gitlow
case....
J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YouNG, CONsTrnoNA LAw 875 n.12 (2d ed. 1983).
- 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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of enlistment. Schenck distributed pamphlets that urged resist-
ance to the draft, denounced conscription, and impugned the
motives of those backing the war effort. In rejecting a First
Amendment defense to the conviction, Justice Holmes articu-
lated the following test:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a




The evils of causing insubordination in the military and ob-
structing enlistment in the armed forces are certainly evils which
Congress may proscribe and punish under its power to raise and
maintain armies.210 The important issue in Schenck is how Con-
gress attempted to establish the connection between the regulable
conduct evils and any speech activity. The pertinent provisions
of the Espionage Act of 1917211 did not specifically mention any
kind of language that was intrinsically evil or regulable. The
statute itself only proscribed certain conduct evils, and the Court,
through its formulation of the clear and present danger test,
created the means of establishing the nexus between the speech
activity and the statutorily proscribed conduct evil.212 Congress
Id. at 52.
2,0 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
-1" The 1917 Espionage Act, presently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1948), created
three new offenses:
[1] Whoever, when the United States is at war, willfully makes or conveys
false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation
or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote
the success of its enemies; or [2] whoever, when the United States is at war,
willfully causes or attempts to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or
refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States; or [3]
willfully obstructs the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States,
to the injury of the service or of the United States, or attempts to do so shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years,
or both.
.12 In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), Justice Sanford described the kind
of statute at issue in Schenck as follows:
It is clear that the question in such cases is entirely different from
[Vol. 75
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did not establish any connection between those conduct evils
and any specifically defined speech activity.213 In order to uphold
the convictions in Schenck,2 4 the Court had to connect the
speech activity of Schenck to the conduct evils proscribed by
Congress. The clear and present danger test was the tool of
statutory construction by which the Court could consider
Schenck's speech to be the functional equivalent of a statutorily
defined attempt to cause insubordination or obstruction of the
recruiting or enlistment service of the armed forces.
21 5
that involved in those cases where the statute merely prohibits certain acts
involving the danger of substantive evil, without any reference to language
itself, and it is sought to apply its provisions to language used by the
defendant for the purpose of bringing about the prohibited results. There,
if it be contended that the statute cannot be applied to the language used
by the defendant because of its protection by the freedom of speech or
press, it must necessarily be found, as an original question, without any
previous determination by the legislative body, whether the specific lan-
guage used involved such likelihood of bringing about the substantive evil
as to deprive it of the constitutional protection.
Id. at 670-71.
21 Id.
2 There is a strong argument that the political and military exigencies of a wartime
situation affect how the Supreme Court deals with First Amendment claims:
War and preparation for war create serious strains on a system of
freedom of expression. Emotions run high, lowering the degree of ration-
ality which is required to make such a system viable. It becomes more
difficult to hold the rough give-and-take of controlled controversy within
constructive bounds. Immediate events assume greater importance; long-
range considerations are pushed to the background. The need for consensus
appears more urgent in the context of dealing with hostile outsiders.
Cleavage seems to be more dangerous, and dissent more difficult to distin-
guish from actual aid to the enemy. In this volatile area the constitutional
guarantee of free and open discussion is put to its most severe test.
It is not surprising, therefore, that throughout our history periods of
war tension have been marked by serious infringements on freedom of ex-
pression ...
Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 975 (1968).
I" Justice Holmes had introduced the 'clear and present danger' test for unani-
mous Court in Schenck v. United States, which sustained a conviction
under provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917 written in "nonspeech"
terms. The violation charged to the "conspiracy" was the circulation of a
leaflet which in "impassioned language" opposed the war and conscription
and called upon draftees to 'assert their rights.' The defense argued that
distributing the leaflet, even if it was both intended and likely to obstruct
the successful execution of the draft, could not constitutionally be punished
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75
It is important to note that in Schenck, as in other cases
using a clear and present danger analysis,216 the legislature has
not established a conclusive nexus between the conduct evil and
speech.217 The medium of communication in Schenck was written
speech. In cases involving written or oral speech25 it is more
difficult for a legislature to establish the nexus between conduct
evil and speech than in a situation involving symbolic speech,
where the action itself is the medium of expression.2 19 Simply
put, in many cases involving written or oral communication, the
legislature cannot tell when a regulable conduct evil will attend
a certain kind of speech activity and therefore cannot posit into
the legislation a high enough correlation between the conduct
evil and the speech to warrant a statutorily-defined, blanket
regulation of the speech. The result of this legislative inability
to remove the contingency between conduct evil and speech is
that, if certain speech activity is to be regulated, the courts must
establish a close enough link between the conduct evil and the
speech to warrant the regulation of the speech on a case-by-case
basis. The clear and present danger analysis is the primary
method used by the courts.220
as a violation of the Act. It was to meet this first amendment claim that
Holmes coined what was to become known as the 'clear and present danger'
test.
In Schenck the "proximity and degree" of danger had served as a constitutional
measure to test when words alone could be found to qualify as the act that Congress
had intended to prohibit.
Linde, supra note 12, at 1170-71.
-1, See notes 218-20 infra.
217 "[A] clear and present danger test makes sense only on the premise that it may
justify suppression of speech which, in the absence of the particular exigent circumstan-
ces, would indeed be privileged under the first amendment." Linde, supra note 12, at
1169.
M For an example of this principle in a case involving oral speech, see Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). In Debs, the Court sustained the conviction of a
prominent socialist, Eugene V. Debs. During a speech on socialism and opposition to
the war, Debs praised draft resisters, saying, "You need to know that you are fit for
something better than slavery and common fodder." Id. at 214. The Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction because the jury could find that his remarks had a tendency to
obstruct recruiting, and that Debs had that intent.
1,9 See the discussion of United States v. O'Brien at notes 60-106 supra and
accompanying text.
2" The clear and present danger test may manifest itself in different forms, but the
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Applying the clear and present danger test to different fact
situations, a court will consider a number of different elements
to determine whether the activity of the speaker bears a suffi-
ciently close relation to the conduct evil regulable by the legis-
lature. Under the Schenck formulation of the clear and present
danger test, 2 ' courts will consider the context surrounding the
speech,' the nature of the speech, 2 3 whether there exists a high
probability of the conduct evil following the speech," the degree
of imminency that exists between the occurrence of the speech and
the happening of the conduct evil 22 s and whether the legislature
analysis remains essentially the same. For example, in Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Supreme Court dealt with a situation in which high
school and junior high school students wore black armbands to school to protest the
war in Vietnam. The school board adopted a policy requiring the suspension of any
student at school with an armband. The suspension would stay in effect until the student
returned without an armband. In setting forth the test for a majority of the Court,
Justice Fortas said "[clertainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging
in of the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,' the prohibition
cannot be sustained." Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
' See note 209 supra and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the effect of war on the protections afforded by the First
Amendment, see note 214 supra.
"1- The United States Supreme Court traditionally has recognized a difference of
constitutional magnitude between advocacy of ideas and incitement to action. See Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 320 (1957).
-, The Court in Yates, employed a calculus in analyzing whether a particular
utterance is protected by the First Amendment. In discussing the permissibility of
punishing speech that advocates future violent action, the Court said:
The essence of the Dennis holding was that indoctrination of a group
in preparation for future violent action, as well as exhortation to immediate
action, by advocacy found to be directed to 'action for the accomplishment'
of forcible overthrow, to violence 'as a rule or principle of action,' and
employing 'language of incitement,' ... is not constitutionally protected
when the group is of sufficient size and cohesiveness, is sufficiently oriented
towards action, and other circumstances are such as reasonably to justify
apprehension that action will occur.
Id. at 321 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 511-12 (1951)).
2, Elevated to constitutional level, the danger test, retaining much of its original
evidentiary flavor, became a device whereby, for legislation to pass con-
stitutional muster, it must be demonstrated that a permissible objective of
government is imminently and substantially threatened. Permissible objec-
tives were identified without analysis as "certain substantive evils" with
respect to which government possessed some authority. Yet by the new test
government was empowered to take action only on proof of the immediacy
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has a right to regulate the conduct evil addressed by the statute.226
In operation, courts will consider these factors227 to determine
whether the particular speech is related closely enough to some con-
duct evil so that a legislature may incidentally impinge upon the
rights of a speaker when attempting to prevent the occurrence of
the conduct. When a legislature cannot prospectively determine that
a regulable conduct evil will always attend a certain speech activ-
ity, the courts must do so on an individualized basis.
B. Dennis v. United States
This same analysis is reflected in the formulation of the clear
and present danger test used by Chief Justice Vinson in Dennis
v. United States.228 In Dennis, the Court sustained conspiracy
convictions under the Smith Act. 229 The defendants were charged
with conspiring to organize the Communist Party of the United
of serious peril to one or more of those substantive evils.
Strong, supra note 48, at 46.
'2 Besides . . . special classes of words which cause present injury, the
normal law punished speech as an attempt or solicitation, although it falls
short of actual injury; but ... this is only when the words come somewhere
near success and render the commission of actual crime or other tangible ob-
struction of state activities probable unless the state steps in at once and
penalizes the conduct before it ripens into injury. The law of attempts and
solicitation is directed not against the words but against acts, and the words
are punished only because that is the necessary way to avoid harmful acts.
Z. CHAFE, supra note 43, at 152.
"I Professor Linde set forth a different list of elements inherent in a clear and
present danger analysis:
Four elements of analysis emerge: (1) the substantive content of the
message-advocacy of concrete unlawful action as distinguished from ad-
vocacy of unlawful action as a principle; (2) the tenor of the message-
advocacy in terms 'reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite' the
audience to take the action advocated; (3) the advocate's state of mind-
the specific intent to see the unlawful action carried out, or to participate
in an organization for that specific purpose; and (4) the objective conditions
in which the advocacy occurs-the 'danger.'
Linde, supra note 12, at 1166-67.
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
2 See id. at 495-98, citing to 18 U.S.C. § 11 (1946). The modified Act is now
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970).
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States, a society which teaches and advocates the overthrow and




In assessing the constitutionality of the Smith Act convic-
tions, Chief Justice Vinson 23' adopted Judge Learned Hand's
232
interpretation of the clear and present danger test: "In each case
courts must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger.1 233 Chief Justice Vinson preferred
this test, at least in part, because "it is as succinct and inclusive
as any other we might devise at this time. It takes into consid-
eration those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their
significances. ' 234 By "relating the significances ' 235 of the factors
in a free speech case, the Dennis standard implies a three part
balancing test. First, one must identify the evil the legislature is
trying to regulate and ascribe an appropriate gravity to that
evil.2 6 Second, the gravity of the evil must be discounted by its
improbability, including the Schenck elements of certainty, im-
minency, and circumstances. 237 Finally, the discounted evil must
be balanced against the invasion of free speech interests to
determine whether the impingement of the right is justified by
the seriousness of the discounted evil.
238
Because of its focus on the net gravity of the evil being
regulated, the Dennis version of the clear and present danger
test is very similar to the four-part balancing test of O'Brien.239
Once the legislative determination that a definable conduct evil
always attends a certain kind of speech is accepted by a court,
the Dennis clear and present danger test collapses into an O'Brien
analysis.
341 U.S. at 497-99.
" Chief Justice Vinson's opinion was joined by Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton.
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred in the judgment, each writing a separate
opinion.
", United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2nd Cir. 1950).






See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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Dennis is indistinguishable from O'Brien because the legis-
lature established a one-hundred percent probability of the con-
duct evil attending the speech. Under the Dennis test, therefore,
the improbability is zero and the evil regulated by the statute is
not discounted at all but simply balanced against the speech
interests involved. Once the Court embarks on a balancing proc-
ess, the elimination of any discounting factors increases the
number of cases in which the balance may tip in favor of state
or municipal regulation of speech activity.
C. New York v. Ferber
The balancing process developed in Dennis was reflected in
New York v. Ferber,2 when the Supreme Court held that child
pornography was outside the protection of the First Amend-
ment.24' In Ferber, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a
First Amendment attack on a New York law242 designed to deal
with the problem of child pornography. At issue was a state
criminal statute that prohibited persons from knowingly pro-
moting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen
by distributing material which depicts such performances. 243
Ferber, the owner of a Manhattan store specializing in sex-
ually oriented products, sold two films to an undercover police
officer. The films were devoted almost exclusively to depiction
of young boys masturbating. Ferber was convicted of two counts
of promoting a sexual performance by a child with knowledge
of the character and content of the films sold to the police.244
The New York Court of Appeals reversed Ferber's convictions,
- 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
2'1 Id. at 763-64.
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 263.00, 263.10, 263.15 (McKinney 1980).
24 458 U.S. at 749.
2" The following §§ of the New York Penal Law were at issue in Ferber.
"A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child
when, knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or
promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less
than sixteen years of age." § 263.15.
To "promote" is also defined:
" 'Promote' means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail,
[Vol. 75
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holding that the statute violated the first amendment."" The
United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
that the New York statute, as applied to Ferber, did not violate
the first amendment.
24 6
It should be noted that the statute under which Ferber was
convicted 247 did not require proof that the films were obscene
under traditional first amendment standards. 4 8 After charac-
terizing the governmental objective of the statute as the preven-
tion of sexual exploitation and abuse of children who are made
to engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes, 249 the
Court explained that the obscenity test from Miller v. California0
was not applicable to enable a state to pursue its constitutionally
acceptable objective of prosecuting those who promote the sexual
exploitation of childrenY' It is important to consider the foun-
dation upon which the Court concluded that the Miller standards
were inapposite to the constitutionality of the New York statute.
The Court was quick to endorse the legislative findings re-
garding the "proliferation of exploitation of children as subjects
in sexual performances. ' 25 2 Citing the virtual unanimity of fed-
deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, ex-
hibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same." § 263.00(5).
A companion provision bans only the knowing dissemination of obscene material.
§ 263.10.
Id. at 751.
:" Id. at 752.
Id. at 774.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15.
458 U.S. at 752.
Id. at 753, 757.
, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
458 U.S. at 761. See also Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, id. at 774-75.
For a different view of the relevance of the Miller obscenity test, see the concurring
opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, id. at 775-77.
12 The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a gov-
ernment objective of surpassing importance. The legislative findings accompanying pas-
sage of the New York laws reflect this concern:
[T]here has been a proliferation of exploitation of children as subjects
in sexual performances. The care of children is a sacred trust and should
not be abused by those who seek to profit through a commercial network
based upon the exploitation of children. The public policy of the state
demands the protection of children from exploitation through sexual per-
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
eral and state governments in condemning and regulating child
pornography, as well as relevant literature to the same effect,2
3
the Court declared that it would not second-guess the legislative
judgment of New York. 254 As Justice White asserted for the
majority: "That judgment, we think, easily passes muster under
the first amendment." ' 211 One must ask precisely what Justice
White meant when he concluded that the New York legislative
judgment passed muster under the first amendment. Is it con-
stitutionally dispositive that all or most states and the federal
government agree that there is a proliferating evil of child por-
nography? Is there sufficient empirical proof to establish the
harm that occurs to children from acting in sexually explicit
films? Or, in Ferber, did the majority simply rationalize an
intuitive agreement with the legislative action? 2 6 In any event,
the majority opinion seems to indicate that some legislative
judgments will provide an acceptable basis for regulating speech
where others will not.2 7 Clearly, at least part of the reason the
Court found a sufficiently sound constitutional basis for the
statute was the prevalent nationwide belief that child pornogra-
phy is a serious problem.
58
formances.
Id. at 757 (quoting 1977 N.Y. Laws, ch. 910, § 1).
- 458 U.S. at 758 n.9.
1 4 Id. at 758.
255 Id.
21 The concept of judicial bias as an element of the decisionmaking process is not
new. "The truth is that the major premise of most of the great decisions of the Supreme
Court is a concealed bias of some some-a highly laudable bias perhaps, yet a bias."
Corwin, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Acts of Congress, 4 MICH. L. Rv.
616, 625 (1906).
117 458 U.S. at 755.
21 In recent years, the exploitive use of children in the production of porno-
graphy has become a serious national problem. The Federal Government and
47 States have sought to combat the problem with statutes specifically directed
at the production of child pornography. At least half of such statutes do
not require that the materials produced be legally obscene. Thirty-five
States and the United States Congress have also passed legislation pro-
hibiting the distribution of such materials; 20 States prohibit the distribu-
tion of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct without
requiring that the material be legally obscene.
Id. at 749 (footnotes omitted).
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The Court's focus when scrutinizing the legislation was also
important in finding the New York legislative judgment passed
first amendment muster.5 9 Any time a reviewing court passes
on the constitutionality of a statute, it is faced with a number
of choices between or among competing values, rights, or inter-
ests. The value preferences that a court must make reflect the
interests not only of the litigants in the particular case, but also
of society (however the court perceives that entity), and of the
individual judge or judges hearing the case. 260 Within the range
of available value choices, a court will choose one or more as
the articulated basis for its decision. Other values may, however,
serve as the real basis for the decision, albeit unconsciously or
at least without being articulated. 26' The court's underlying value
preference may have a great deal to do with the methodology
of its review process. 262 In Ferber, for instance, the Court chose
between two values in determining the focus of its analysis. The
first and dispositive interest in the case was the protection of
children from being exploited by being made to perform explicit
depictions of sexual activity.2 63 The other interest was the first
" Id. at 758.
: Contrast this position with that of Professor Cox, who argues for a more
principled form of jurisprudence:
The function of the Court-the role implicitly assigned to it by history
as well as the fact of its having been created as a court-is illuminated by
contrast with the political branches. Its decisions are legitimate only when
it seeks to dissociate itself from individual or group interests, and to judge
by disinterested and more objective standards.
The ability to rationalize a constitutional judgment honestly in terms of prin-
ciples referrable to legal precedent and other accepted sources of law is, by
the lawyers' tradition, an essential major ingredient of the Court's power to
command acceptance and support. In the case of judicial rulings the power
of legitimacy is thought to depend largely upon the realization that the ma-
jor influence in a decision in not personal fiat, but principles which bind the
judges as well as the litigants, and which apply uniformly to all men not only
today but yesterday and tomorrow.
A. Cox, THE ROLE OF Tim SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1976).
"I See generally Prygoski, Of Predispositions and Dispositions: An Attitudinal
Study of Decisionmaking in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 21 Hous. L. REV. 883
(1984) (discussion of the manner in which unconscious factors may affect decisionmak-
ing).
Y,2 Id.
458 U.S. at 753-66.
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amendment free speech interest of the purveyors and consumers




Justice White, writing for the majority in Ferber, appropri-
ately showed great deference to the legislative decision to protect
children from sexual exploitation by the means of a criminal
statute proscribing the promotion of child pornography. 26 The
Court's sympathy for, and deference to, the legislative scheme,
allowed it to conclude that the Miller obscenity standard
does not reflect the State's particular and more compelling
interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploi-
tation of children. Thus, the question under the Miller test of
whether a work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest of the average person bears no connection to the issue
of whether a child has been physically or psychologically harmed
in the production of the work.
266
If the evil that the statute is designed to prevent is harm to
children suffered from their appearance in sexually explicit mov-
ies or books, that harm occurs "whether or not the material
... has a literary, artistic, political, or social value. ' 267 Justice
O'Connor stated the point very well in her concurrence:
For example, a 12-year-old child photographed while mastur-
bating surely suffers the same psychological harm whether the
community labels the photograph "edifying" or "tasteless."
The audience's appreciation of the depiction is simply irrele-
vant to New York's asserted interest in protecting children
from psychological, emotional, and mental harm.26
Justice Brennan's concurrence asserted a methodology of
review that reflects a different value choice as the premise of
analysis. He appears to have been more concerned with the free
:" Id.
61 Id. at 761.
2m Id.
16 Id. (quoting memorandum of Assemblyman Lasher in support of N.Y. PENAL
LAW).
"I Id. at 774-75.
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speech interests of purveyors and consumers than with the in-
terest of the state in preventing the sexual exploitation of chil-
dren.269 This is not to say that Justice Brennan was unconcerned
with the welfare of children in these situations, but rather that
he prefered the free speech values over those advanced by the
state through its child pornography statute. Justice Brennan
argued that the application of a criminal statute "to depictions
of children that in themselves do have serious literary, artistic,
scientific, or medical value, would violate the first amend-
ment." 270 He contended that:
the limited classes of speech, the suppression of which does
not raise serious first amendment concerns, have two attri-
butes. They are of exceedingly 'slight social value,' and the
State has a compelling interest in their regulation. The first
amendment value of depictions of children that are in them-
selves serious contributions to art, literature, or science, is, by
definition, simply not 'de minimis.' At the same time, the
State's interest in suppression of such materials is likely to be
far less compelling.
27'
In relation to the State's interest being less compelling, Justice
Brennan argued that if the material produced had some serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value, then the child would
not be as stigmatized by permanent record and circulation of
his or her participation as would be the case with material that
has no first amendment value.
2 72
Although this argument has merit, it ignores the harm to the
child caused by the production of the materials. Prevention of
that harm remains a compelling state interest, irrespective of the
categorization of the material by society.27a Justice Brennan's
priority system would sacrifice the welfare of children for the
interests of consumers who wish to view works that meet the
Miller criteria of nonobscenity. Under Justice Brennan's analy-
1 Id. at 775-77.
o Id. at 776.
"' Id.
12 Id. at 776-77.
2" See notes 267-68 supra and accompanying text.
1986-871
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
sis, a producer of sexually explicit movies, photographs, or
books, that used children as live models, would be immune from
governmental regulation unless the works were found to be
obscene under the Miller test. What if the pictures were included
in a medical textbook, but were also sold individually, to people
with an interest in child pornography? Would the producer then
be immune from criminal prosecution? Would he be punishable
only for the sale of the photographs to individuals? Would it
make any difference to the child in the pictures, who had no
idea of the intended use?
If Justice Brennan primarily focuses on the first amendment
interests of purveyors and consumers, his analysis is likely to
stay within the traditional first amendment guidelines pertaining
to obscenity. He would test each and every work to determine
if it met the Miller criteria for obscenity. This case-by-case
analysis would, in comparison to the majority's categorization
approach, place much more material in the realm of protected
speech. From the child models' perspective, the Brennan ap-
proach would allow for the victimization of many more children.
The conclusion depends on the original value preference used by
the individual members of the Court.
The majority in Ferber employed a categorization approach
that simply classifies "child pornography as a category of ma-
terial outside the protection of the first amendment." 7 ' "The
question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the first amend-
ment often depends on the content of the speech." '75 The majority
stated:
Thus, it is not rare that a content-based classification of speech
has been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized
that within the confines of the given classification, the evil to
be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive inter-
ests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudi-
cation is required.2 76
11 458 U.S. at 763.
"I Id. (quoting Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)).
276 Id. at 763-64.
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Thus, in a case involving the regulation of "child pornog-
raphy,' 277 the Court's only role is to determine whether the
statute was legitimately enacted 2 8 and whether the trier of fact
made a reasonable decision that the work fell within the statutory
classification. The majority approach in Ferber, then, is virtually
identical to the position espoused by Justice Sanford in Gitlow
and Whitney:
279
In other words, when the legislative body has determined
generally, in the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that
utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive
evil that they may be punished, the question whether any
specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely,
in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open
to consideration. It is sufficient that the statute itself be con-
stitutional, and that the use of the language comes within its
prohibition. 0
Ferber is not only, in historical terms, a return to the judicial
methodology of Gitlow and Whitney, 28 ' but also another
example 282 of the legislative declaration that an identifiable con-
duct evil always accompanies a certain kind of speech activity.
The substantive evil of exploitation and abuse of children by
using them as live models in depictions of sexually explicit ac-
I" The majority in Ferber made it clear that "child pornography" must be ade-
quately and narrowly defined by state law: "There are, of course, limits on the category
of child pornography which, like obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment. As
with all legislation in this sensitive area, the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately
defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed." Id. at 764.
"8 Although the methodology of a reviewing court may be couched in terms of
"categorization," balancing is still an implicit part of its analysis. In order to categorize
certain speech as outside the protections of the First Amendment, the Court must defer
to the balance struck by the legislature in its consideration of the interests involved.
"When a definable class material ... bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare
of children engaged in its production, we think the balance of competing interests is
clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these materials as without the
protection of the First Amendment." Id.
I See notes 13-35 supra and accompanying text.
'1 See note 32 supra (Justice Sanford writing for the majority in Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925)).
See notes 13-35 supra and accompanying text.




tivities always attends the production of such a work, irrespective
of the first amendment protection the work might otherwise
enjoy.
Ferber is a recent example of a case in which the legislature
asserted, and the Court accepted, simultaneity of conduct evil
and speech. "3 Once the statutorily proscribed speech has been en-
gaged in, there is no doubt of the occurrence of the conduct evil.
As in O'Brien284 and Young, 281 there is a one-hundred percent
correlation between the legislatively defined substantive evil and
the speech activity. Coupling this high correlation with the grav-
ity of the evil involved in Ferber, it is not surprising that the
Court simply declared child pornography to be outside First
Amendment protection.2 86
D. American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut 87
The categorization approach accepted by the Court in Ferber
was also argued in an attack on a municipal ordinance that made
pornography, as defined by the ordinance, a form of exploitation
and resulted in discrimination against women as a class.288
In American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the holding
of the district court that an Indianapolis ordinance that defined
"pornography" as a practice that discriminates against women
violated the first amendment freedom of speech protections.2 8 9
In passing the ordinance,29 the Indianapolis-Marion County
City-County Council ("Council") made the following findings
of legislative fact:
w 458 U.S. at 758.
2" See notes 60-108 supra and accompanying text.
291 See notes 109-95 supra and accompanying text.
21 458 U.S. at 763.
28 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), affd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). The
United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit.
Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor dissented stating they
wanted to set the case for oral argument. See 106 S.Ct. 1172 (1986).
2 American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1935).
771 F.2d at 334.
-o For a discussion of this and other similar ordinances, see generally Gershel,
Evaluating a Proposed Civil Rights Approach to Pornography: Legal Analysis as if
Women Mattered, 11 Wm. MrrCHELL L. REv. 41 (1985); MacKinnon, Pornography,
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Pornography is a discriminatory practice based on sex
which denies women equal opportunities in society. Pornog-
raphy is central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis for
discrimination. Pornography is a systematic practice of ex-
ploitation and subordination based on sex which differentially
harms women. The bigotry and contempt it promotes, with
the acts of aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities
for equality of rights in employment, education, access to and
use of public accommodations, and acquisition of real prop-
erty; promote rape, battery, child abuse, kidnapping and pros-
titution and inhibit just enforcement of laws against such acts;
and contribute significantly to restricting women in particular
from full exercise of citizenship and participation in public
life, including in neighborhoods.
29'
"Pornography" under the ordinance is "the graphic sexually
explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words"
in certain enumerated situations. 292
Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HA. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985); Tigue, Civil Rights
and Censorship-Incompatible Bedfellows, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81 (1985); Note,
The Minneapolis Anti-Pornography Ordinance: A Valid Assertion of Civil Rights?, 13
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 909 (1984-85).
r" 598 F. Supp. at 1320 (citing INDIANAPOLIS CODE § 16-1(a)(2) (1984)).
r The entire definitional section is as follows:
(q) Pornography shall mean the graphic sexually explicit subordination of
women, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more
of the following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humili-
ation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure
in being raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or
severed into body parts; or
(4) Women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abusement, tor-
ture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that
makes these conditions sexual; and
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, viola-
tion, exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of
servility or submission or display.
The use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of women in
paragraphs (1) through (6) above shall also constitute pornography under
this section.
INDIANAPOLIS CODE § 16-3(q) (1984).
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An important aspect of the ordinance, as with the statute in
Ferber,293 is that it makes no attempt to conform to the obscenity
standards of Miller.294 As in Ferber, the ordinance in Hudnut is
not directed to the vindication of community standards of of-
fensiveness. 295 Rather, it is an attempt to further some other
goal, specifically the alteration of the manner in which men and
women are socialized, 29 and, therefore, relate to one another.
The court of appeals purported to "accept the premises of
this legislation. Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate
subordination. The subordinate status of women in turn leads
to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at home,
battery and rape on the streets. "297 Despite its alleged acceptance
of the premises of the ordinance, however, the court of appeals
affirmed the invalidation of the ordinance because its "unhappy
effects depend on mental intermediation. "298 In other words,
"pornography" merely "affects how people see the world, their
fellows, and social relations. ' ' 29 The court of appeals must have
based its argument on the premise that some process of percep-
tion, processing, and conscious choice occurs between the con-
sumption of pornography and the substantive evils that the
ordinance is designed to prevent. Their analysis belies the court's
contention that it accepted the premises of the ordinances. In
terms of the analysis applied to the other cases discussed in this
19 See notes 247-69 supra and accompanying text.
'" "The Indianapolis ordinance does not refer to the purient interest, to offensive-
ness, or to the standards of the community. It demands attention to particular depictions,
not to the work judged as a whole. It is irrelevant under the ordinance whether the
work has literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 771 F.2d at 324-25.
9 Id. at 325.
2 Id.
Id. at 329. By way of clarifying its acceptance of the legislative premise, the
court of appeals asserts:
In saying that we accept the finding that pornography as the ordinance
defines it leads to unhappy consequences, we mean only that there is
evidence to this effect, that this evidence is consistent with much human
experience, and that as judges we must accept the legislative resolution of






Article, the court of appeals was not satisfied that the Council
established a sufficiently close nexus between the production and
consumption of "pornography," and the occurrence of the sub-
stantive evils of subordination of women and sex discrimina-
tion. oo
At one point, the court of appeals asserted that "[c]ases such
as Brandenburg v. Ohio and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
hold that a state may not penalize speech that does not cause
immediate injury."30' Young 02 refutes that proposition. It dem-
onstrates that if the legislature is able to show a sufficiently high
probability of a substantive evil following speech activity, the
speech may be regulated even if imminency of substantive evil
is not present.303
The "lack of immediate injury" argument should not be the
dispositive factor in analyzing an ordinance such as the one in
Hudnut. The real issue, which encompasses both time and prob-
ability, is the extent to which a court defers to the legislative
declaration of a causal connection between the presumptively
protected speech activity and the substantive evil that the legis-
lature has a right to regulate.
Discussing the issue of whether the legislature established a sufficient empirical
basis for its conclusion that "pornography" causes subordination of women and sex
discrimination, the district court stated:
Defendants again rely on Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed. 310 (1976), contending that since the
legislation in that case was upheld upon a single affidavit of a sociologist
that the location of adult movie theatres has a disruptive impact on the
community, the Ordinance should be upheld because there is more than
enough data to demonstrate that pornography harms women. As discussed
above, however, the legislation in Young sought to regulate the place where
pornography could be distributed, not to completely ban its distribution.
Thus Young is not controlling.
598 F. Supp. at 1337 n.5.
To a certain extent, this explanation by the district court confuses the sufficiency
of the empirical evidence supporting a law with the severity of the regulation the law
imposes. Even though the attempted legislative means differed between Young and
Hudnut, the goal or objective of the legislature in Hudnut certainly appears to be more
solidly grounded in empirical data than does the causal connection on which the Detroit
Commerce Council relied in Young.
771 F.2d at 333.
'-" See notes 109-95 supra and accompanying text.
' See note 224 supra for an example of a case in which a government may punish
speech designed to incite illegal action at some future time.
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IV. CONCLUSION
An analysis that focuses on the extent to which a court
believes that a legislature established a sufficiently high correla-
tion between speech activity and conduct evil will add clarity
and consistency to the discussion of free speech issues. Although
certain labels and categories are useful in describing how courts
analyze free speech cases, it appears that courts consistently use
a balancing approach which, consciously or unconsciously, re-
flects the importance a court may give to different value choices.3t 4
While it is helpful to discuss the intrinsic merits of each of the
values that compete in free speech analysis, it is also useful to
consider separation of powers and federalism principles as they
enter in the first amendment equation." 5 These considerations,
and the deference a court pays them, will determine the structure
in which a court will review governmental action that allegedly
abridges speech. That structure, be it a test, label, category or
presumption, will in turn greatly affect the direction and process
of a court's first amendment analysis.
Although Gitlow and Whitney are old cases which have little
" Insofar as the Supreme Court has developed any general theory of the First
Amendment it is the ad hoc balancing formula. The clear and present
danger test and recently the incitement test have been employed in some
cases in which the utterance might directly lead to a violation of law.
Special rules have evolved in libel, privacy, and obscenity cases. But the
Court's residual theory-its sole generalized formulation-has been ad hoc
balancing. This test seems to be the only one acceptable to a majority for
solving numerous First Amendment problems, such as those involved in
denial of benefits or privileges, business regulations, legislative committees,
free press-fair trial, and many other areas.
Emerson, supra note 39, at 717-18.
"I In his dissent in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 556 (1980), Chief
Justice Burger stated, "This is the long arm and voracious appetite of federal power-
this time judicial power-with a vengeance, reaching and absorbing traditional concepts
of local authority."
Justice Rehnquist also stated in his dissent in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 606 (1980):
But to gradually rein in, as this Court has done over the past generation,
all of the ultimate decision making power over how justice shall be admin-
istered, not merely in the federal system but in each of the 50 States, is a
task that no Court consisting of nine persons, however gifted, is equal to.
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present value as precedent,306 they provide a useful point of
departure for analyzing modern first amendment cases. In one
sense, they are useful because the analysis of the United States
Supreme Court, unsophisticated as it may now seem, dealt openly
and primarily in the realm of the relationship between the federal
judiciary and state legislatures. Concepts of federalism and sep-
aration of powers loomed very large in Justice Sanford's opin-
ions in those cases a07 Furthermore, those concepts were the
starting point of the Court's analysis of the free speech claims
in those cases. 08
This focal point provides a framework of analysis that would
allow a court to set forth the institutional and individual values
in a given case, engage in whatever balancing process it deems
appropriate, and decide the case free from the categories and
labels which now seem to obfuscate, rather than clarify, free
speech analysis. Questions of whether a given case is a clear and
present danger case, a symbolic speech case, a zoning case, a
child pornography case, or any other kind of case, would col-
lapse into a straightforward articulation and balancing of the
institutional and individual interests before a court. Perhaps all
this Article asks is that the judicial system adjust its vision a
few degrees so that we all may see things a bit more clearly.
' Whitney v. California was overruled by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969).
-' See notes 13-36 supra and accompanying text.
' Id.
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